Abstract. Static program analysis complements traditional dynamic testing by discovering generic patterns and relations on source code, which can indicate software deficiencies such as memory corruption, unexpected program behavior and memory leaks. Since static program analysis builds on approximations of a program's concrete behavior there is often a trade-off between reporting potential bugs which might be the result of an over-approximation and silently suppressing those defects in that grey area. While this trade-off is less important for small files it has severe implications when facing large software packages, i.e., 1, 000, 000 LoC and more. In this work we present an experience report on using our static C/C++ analyzer Goanna on such large software systems, reason why a flexible property specification language is vital, and present a number of decisions for choosing the right checks as well as a sensible reporting strategy. We illustrate our findings by empirical data obtained from regularly analyzing the Firefox source code.
Introduction
Traditional software testing is an integral part in the software quality assurance process to validate the overall design, to find bugs in the implementation and to create a limited trust in the correctness of a system. The advantages of traditional testing are that functional behavior of the software can be examined, it can be carried out for the real implementation on the real hardware in contrast, e.g., to purely model-based approaches. The disadvantages are that testing typically can only execute a limited set of program behaviors, i.e., even if all program paths are executed only a limited set of inputs can be examined, and sometimes some significant manual effort is required to set up the test cases in the first place. One of the most significant disadvantages is probably that testing does not scale well to large code bases. There are typically an infeasible amount of test cases and program paths to consider to achieve a trustworthy coverage.
Static program analysis can alleviate some of the aforementioned disadvantages. In contrast to traditional testing, static program analysis does not execute the implementation, but analyzes the source code for know dangerous programming constructs, for combinations of those and their causal relationships, and the impact of potentially tainted input. Typical examples in C/C++ code are null pointer dereferences, accessing freed memory, creating memory leaks, or creating exploits through buffer overruns. These types of bugs are on the one hand hard to find by traditional testing and on the other hand are not really intended to be found by testing in the first place, as testing is focussed on checking the functional behavior. Because static program analysis can pinpoint those software deficiencies, is scalable to large code bases and can be run fully automatically, it is a way to complement traditional testing.
By not executing the real code but examining syntactic relations within the source code, static program analysis cannot always be precise. This means, overapproximations are used to best estimate the actual program behavior. This inevitably leads to false alarms, i.e., warnings which are spurious and do not correlate to an actual execution. The art of static program analysis is to minimize this grey area of potential false alarms. There are three options which are generally considered: Not reporting any bugs that might be the result of over-approximations, adding semantic information to the analysis to make the approximation more precise, or reverting to an under-approximation all together, i.e., only consider definite bugs in the analysis.
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In this paper we present a number of results and experiences of developing a static program analyzer from a tool builder's point of view. We in particular look at common software bugs and potential false alarms, which we discovered in large source code bases. False alarms in this work comprise false positives as defined by formal language semantics, as well as unnecessary or superfluous alarms as seen from a analysis tool user's point of view. Based on practical observations we present a number of dimensions to classify properties and bugs, we give detailed explanations why we believe those dimensions to be appropriate and substantiate this by several example deficiencies found in large existing code bases.
Moreover, we suggest practical measures and analysis techniques to improve static program analysis results in general. To support our claims, we implemented some of those measures in our static analyzer Goanna and report on the qualitative results we obtained from analyzing the source code of Firefox, which has around 2, 500, 000 LoC after preprocessing.
The paper is structured as follows: In the subsequent Section 2 we summarize the different classes of static program analysis techniques and typical approaches by modern static analysis tools. We briefly describe the underlying technology of our own analyzer Goanna in Section 3. The focus of this work is Section 4 where we in detail present our dimensions for classifying bugs, example deficiencies, as well as measures for improvement. Our empirical data based on analyzing Firefox is presented in Section 5, before presenting our conclusions in Section ??
Dimensions of Static Program Analysis
Static program analysis is a term coined by the compiler community [1, 2] for a set of techniques to investigate a number of program properties without actually executing a program. In recent years those techniques have become popular not only for compiler optimization, but to find certain correlating patterns in programs, which indicate bugs or, more general, software deficiencies.
In the latter we will introduce a number of dimensions to classify bugs and reason for appropriate analysis techniques. In this section we briefly touch on the different types of analyses that classify static checking. The simplest type of analysis is just searching for keywords, potential dangerous library calls and alike without considering any structural or additional semantic information of the program. The more sophisticated the analysis becomes the more computation is typically needed to achieve reasonable results. We consider the following classes of analysis techniques:
Flow-sensitive analysis is taking into account the structure of a program as defined by its control flow graph. In contrast to flow-insensitive simple searches it enables to distinguish between, e.g., a variable being written and read in the same path through the program or on different paths. Path-sensitive analysis considers only valid program paths. Sometimes combinations of if-then-else branches and alike disable certain combinations of branches. This means, those paths are semantically impossible. Context-sensitive analysis takes the context of a function into account such as the value of global variables or of input parameters to a function. Contextsensitive analysis is closely related to inter-procedural analysis where the whole program is taken into account in contrast to intra-procedural analysis, which considers each function in isolation.
Naturally, the more information there is available the better the analysis results. However, from a practical point of view collecting and computing semantic information can require excessive computing, slowing the analysis down to a point where it is not scalable to larger programs. In most circumstance a static analysis tool is only regarded as useful if the analysis time is roughly in the same order of magnitude as the compilation process and not several orders of magnitude higher.
Apart from the semantic depth of the analysis there is a classification on the type of approximation used for program analysis. We distinguish between may and must analyses.
May analysis considers over-approximations of the program behavior. For example in the presents of loops a may analysis might return that a specific variable is written after the loop, although the analyzer itself might not know if this loop ever terminates. Must analysis considers under-approximations of program behavior. In the loop example above a must analysis will not return that the same variable is written as it only considers those effects that are guaranteed to happen. While may analysis can turn up significantly more bugs, the detected bugs does may not exist in the actual program behavior due to infeasible paths or infeasible data dependencies. In this context these warnings are called false positives (or false alarms). Must analysis, however, might miss bugs due to the nature of under-approximating. We talk about false negatives.
To complicate matters further, modern static program analyzers often mix over-and under-approximations within the same analysis run. For instance, the semantics of pointer arithmetic is under-approximated and the semantics of a loops is over-approximated. Those frameworks are not sound, but have proven to be most effective in turning up many bugs without generating many false alarms at the same time [3] .
In Section ?? we discuss alternative use of the term false positive that are motivated from the view point of a user, or from the view point of a tester.
The Goanna Approach to Static Analysis
In this work we use an automata based static analysis framework as implemented in our tool Goanna. The detailed approach can be found in [4] . In contrast to typical equation solving approaches to static analysis the automata based approach [5] [6] [7] defines properties in terms of temporal logic expressions over annotated graphs. The validity of a property can then be checked automatically by graph exploring techniques such as model checking [8, 9] .
The basic idea of our approach is to map a C/C++ program to its corresponding control flow graph (CFG), and to label the CFG with occurrences of syntactic constructs of interest. The CFG together with the labels can easily be mapped to the input language of a model checker or directly translated into a Kripke structure for model checking.
A simple example of this approach is shown in Fig. 1 . Consider the contrived program foo which is allocating some memory, copying it a number of times to a, and freeing the memory in the last loop iteration.
One example of a property to check is whether after freeing some resource, it still might be used. In our automata based approach we syntactically identify program locations that allocate, use, and free resource p. We automatically label the program's CFG with this information as shown on the right hand side of Fig. 1 . This property can then be checked by the CTL property
where AG stands for "for all paths and in all states" and EF for "there exists a path and there exist a state". This means that whenever there is free after malloc for a resource p, there is no path such that p is used later on.
One advantage of this automata based approach is that properties can be modified easily to express stronger/weaker requirements by changing the path quantifier, i.e., changing an A to an E and vice versa. The following property
is only violated if the resource p is used on all paths after being freed. While this relaxed property does not pick up as many bugs as the previous one, it also does not create as many false alarms. This is one way to tune a static program analyzers.
For such properties defined in temporal logic a model checker can automatically check if they are true. Here, obviously, when using the first property the check fails creating a false alarm. The reason is that the model only contains the CFG and the labels, but does not reflect the semantic fact that p is only freed in the last loop operation and never accessed afterwards. The second property, however, will be true, as there is always at least one path, namely exiting the loop after the free-operation, where there us no access to p after free.
While defining checks of different strictness can be one way to tune the bug/false-alarm ratio, another option is to add more semantics information and reflect the fact that it is semantically impossible to access p after a free operation. We implemented a false path elimination 1 strategy based on interval constraint solving that does exactly this. Hence, our implementation can use the first check to find all possible bugs and still rule out many false positives automatically.
We implemented the whole framework in our tool Goanna. Goanna is able to handle full C/C++ including compiler depended switches for then GNU gcc compiler and uses the open source model checker NuSMV [10] as its generic analysis engine. The run-times are typically in the order of the compilation, i.e., we experience an average overhead leading to a 3 to 4 times slower compilation.
With respect to the dimensions introduced in Section 2, from a path perspective Goanna's analysis can easily be tuned from a may to a must analysis (and vice versa) by changing the path quantifier of a property. Moreover, Goanna falls into the category of flow-sensitive, path-sensitive, but unsound program analyzers. This means, Goanna takes the structure of the program into account by always analyzing along the paths in the CFG, it reduces the set of feasible paths by false path elimination and approximates the semantics of different C/C++ constructs differently. This is very much in line with other modern static program analysis tools [11, ?,?] . Although Goanna is not yet context-sensitive the latter examination of bug classes and tuning options remains largely the same.
Practical Classification of Properties and Bugs
The most commonly asked question about static analysis tools is to quantify the false positive rate. This is a seemingly straightforward question, but the answer depends very much on the context. From a developers perspective false positive refers to the warnings that are useless clutter, while true positives are warnings that compel the developer to fix the code. The bug tracking software Fogbugs, for example, distinguishes between "Must Fix" and "Fix If Time" bugs. The decision in which category a warning falls, may depend on the application area, the life cycle of a project, or the maturity of the code, but is to some extent subjective. A deficiency in mature, well tested code might not be fixed unless it there is a serious potential for malfunction, out of concern that fixing the code might introduce new bugs. In contrast, even minor deficiencies are likely be fixed in new code, to ensure maintainability of the project in the future.
From the perspective of testing it matters if a deficiency occurs always or under certain circumstances only. Bugs that occur predictably in every run are easy to find. The only penalty for finding them through testing is that valuable resources have to be spend. In contrast, deficiencies that are data or configuration dependent are much harder to find, since it requires to find specific test cases. Since exhaustive testing is often prohibitive, these kind of bugs can go undetected for a long time, before they manifest themselves. Data-dependent deficiencies are also a common cause for security exploits. In testing jargon bugs that occur always are also called Bohrbugs, while bugs that occur only incidentally are called Heisenbugs [?] . In static analysis there is a third category of warnings, namely those that do not cause any functional misbehavior, but reflect bad coding practice. Deficiencies in this category cannot be found through testing, but only through code inspection or static analysis.
From the perspective of formal language theory true positives are warnings that refer to actual behavior as defined by the program semantics, while false positives refer to warnings that are logically impossible. This decision can either be made locally, by flow-or path-sensitive analysis, or globally, by contextsensitive analysis. With local path-sensitive analysis a warning is a true positive if there exist input to the function, such that the error path becomes possible. With a context-sensitive analysis a warning is only a true positive, if the rest of the system is actually able to provide such an input. If the rest of the system can guarantee that such an input is impossible, the subsystem can use this as an assumption, and guarantee correct behavior under this assumption.
For the development of effective static analysis tools neither of these categories alone are sufficient to consider. It is quite easy to produce warnings that are logically possible, refer to deficiencies that manifest itself always, but will not compel a seasoned developer to change the code. On the other hand, there are warnings that make a developer to fix code, even if in this particular instances it has no functional consequences, but increases robustness and extensibility.
As tool developers we identified three dimensions to judge the quality of warnings.
Severity: high, medium, low.
Incidence: always, sometimes, never.
Correctness: correct, intra-procedural over-approximation, inter-procedural overapproximation.
In the remainder we will discuss each of these categories in detail and provide details to illustrate that the categories are not necessarily correlated, e.g that severity can be independent from incidence. /*file: /mozilla/js/src/fdlibm/e_asin.c */ 127 if(ix<0x3e400000) { /* if |x| < 2**-27 */ 128 if(really_big+x>one) return x;/* return x ...*/ 129 } else 130 t = x*x; -> 131 p = t*(pS0+t*(pS1+t*(pS2+t*(pS3+t*(pS4+t*pS5))))); 132 q = one+t*(qS1+t*(qS2+t*(qS3+t*qS4))); 133 w = p/q; 134 return x+x*w; Table 2 . Warning for an uninitialized variable caused by an accidental "braceless" else-branch
Severity
The severity of a warning can be either high, medium or low, and this is typically how developer categorize bugs. Security flaws, even if they have benign causes or only occur under very specific circumstances, can be more severe than errors that have a much greater immediate impact on functionality. A warning might have medium or high severity, even if close manual inspection cannot establish conclusively, whether there is an actual execution producing the bug. Just the chance for the deficiency to create a run-time bug is sufficient reason to change the code.
Out-of-bounds errors are typical example of deficiencies that that are considered harmful. Table 1 depicts an example. It uses an unsigned (positive) integer numtoks as array subscript, which is initialized to 0 in line 92. The subscript maybe incremented in line 102 and 120, depending on whether certain conditions are true. Variable numtoks will not be updated in line 102, if the condition (carry buf len) in line 92 is false. If the while-condition in line 106 evaluates to false, numtoks will not be incremented, nor if the if-conditions in 111 or 117 evaluate to false. Thus, it is possible that numtoks is not incremented at least once before line 125, and tokens[numtoks-1] will access an element outside of the array leading to a potential buffer overrun.
It is interesting to note that using, however, that all out-of-bounds accesses are necessarily functional errors as the array subscript −1 is a common and accepted practice, used to refer to the last element of the previous array in multidimensional arrays. An out-of-bounds warning for such common use would have a very low severity. This is however not to be the case in this example. Variable numtoks is an unsigned integer, which suggest that the index should be bounded to numbers greater than or equal to zero, and it is unclear if the predecessor array for tokens is defined in any meaningful way. For this reason this warning was classified to have medium severity.
Out-of-bound errors illustrate that warnings that are from the same category, can in a certain context be permissable or even common practice. For tool developer this introduces the problem that it is not sufficient to look at the pro- gram semantics in isolation, but it is also necessary to look at the programmers' intent. Table 2 shows as an example of an uninitialized variable. In this example, variable t will only be initialized in the else-branch in line 130. In line 131 variable t will however be used regardless of whether it was initialized. From indentation it appears that the entire block from line 130 to line 134 was intended to be in the else-branch. In this case, the actual error, missing braces, was caught because it caused the use of an uninitialized variable. This deficiency had been present in the code for several years, but it was not found through testing or bug reports by user, since this code fragment is only invoked for a rare platform. Although obviously a bug, it was classified to have a low severity. Table 3 shows a warning for using a non-virtual destructor in an abstract class. The problem with this construct is that even if a subclass defines it own destructor, it will use the destructor of the abstract class. This might have unexpected consequences -unexpected from the developers point of view, consequences that may include memory leaks. Although the use of a non-virtual destructor in an abstract class may not result in unexpected behavior if all developers are carefully aware of this, it might become a legacy problem. Even if there is no effect, and even if the the associated misbehavior never occurs, this warning is considered important enough for developers to change the code. Table 5 . Warning for an unused variable rv in line 500.
Tuning Implications. One of the conclusions we draw from the above observations is that it is necessary to embed different severity levels foe warnings in a static program analyzer. While, e.g., null pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds errors and potential memory leaks should get a relatively high severity level, code cleanliness such as unused values or dead code should generally get a lower severity level. However, since different stages of product development might have different requirements as reasoned earlier, it is advisable to make those categories configurable and let the user decide which properties should go into which severity level. Goanna is highly configurable and users themselves can group properties into different severity levels and users can also define their own groups. For instance, having a group for ongoing development and a group for legacy code checks. By this Goanna can be adapted according to the users needs which are not fixed a priori.
Incidence
The incidence of a warning refers to whether the associated behavior/bug happens always, or only for some runs. Finding a bug through testing gets harder if the bug depends on the configuration and/or input. An example of a input dependent bug is given in Table 4 . Variable z will be used uninitialized, if the bit-wise comparison (ix0|ix1) in line 218 evaluates to false. Finding this deficiency through testing requires to find a test input such that both variable ix0 /* file:/dom/src/base/nsLocation.cpp */ 890 nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc(do_QueryInterface(window->GetExtantDocument())); 891 892 nsIPresShell *shell; 893 nsPresContext *pcx; -> 894 if (doc && (shell = doc->GetPrimaryShell()) && 895 (pcx = shell->GetPresContext())) { 896 pcx->ClearStyleDataAndReflow(); 897 } Table 6 . The condition on line 894 generates two spurious warnings. An uninitialized variable warning, and an unused assignment warning, both of variable shell.
and ix1 are equal to 0. Static analysis in contrast, applies an abstraction to the possible input, and is therefore capable to pinpoint the error. A drawback of this approximation through abstraction is that static analysis might flag deficiencies that cannot occur, either because a certain combination of conditions never occurs, or because a certain combination of input never occurs. In this example we only have a single condition, and from the comment /* trigger inexact flag */ in line 219, we conclude that the condition can be false. Otherwise the "inexact" case would be the only case. Table 5 shows an unused variable. Even though it might seem counterintuitive, this warning points to a deficiency that occurs always; in each run of the program will not be used. It should be noted that unused variable are rarely of medium or high severity. If at all these deficiencies will be removed only to clean up the code. This is an example of a warning that report a deficiency that manifests itself always, is semantically correct, but still has a low severity.
Tuning Implications. Catching bugs depending on their incidence can best be tuned by the analysis algorithms used. Must analysis is good at picking up bugs which will always occur, while may analysis picks up potential bugs on single executions. Moreover, a path-sensitive analysis can filter out those combinations of conditions, which are infeasible in the execution. To get a better understanding of inputs from other parts of the program and to increase the precision of the analysis a full context-sensitive approach should be used.
Goanna supports the fine tuning of properties by reasoning about some program path or all paths of an execution as described in Section 3. Moreover, Goanna can automatically eliminate infeasible paths that are caused by a set of excluding conditions. Goanna does not perform full context-sensitive analysis, yet. However, there is an argument that every function should be implemented defensively, i.e., inputs should be checked before being used to avoid unexpected crashes.
Correctness
For a given warning it is important to decide if this warning corresponds to an actual execution with respect to the program semantics. A warning can be spurious, i.e., the associated behavior can be logically impossible for the following two reasons: Firstly, because of an over-approximation of the control flow, and secondly, because the context in which a function is used was over-approximated. Table 6 gives an example of two warnings that are caused by an over-approximation of the control flow, in particular of the short-circuit operator &&. While the C and C++ standard leaves the evaluation order for some operators explicitly undefined, i.e., it is compiler depended, it defines that the short-circuit operators are executed from left to right. For the example in Table 6 this means that in line 894 first the variable doc gets evaluated, then shell assigned, and finally shell used. To fix this error it is sufficient to locally refine the control flow graph to reflect this behavior.
Spurious warning that involve the context are much harder to fix. A typical example is null-pointer analysis. Apart from pointer arithmetic aliasing is a known hard problem to address, in particular in a scalable fashion on large code bases. Pointers can be passed through several functions and modified in each of them, which requires at least an inter-procedural (context-sensitive) analysis, which pointer is currently valid or invalid. On the other hand some amount of spurious warnings is acceptable in a null-pointer analysis, given that bugs that are caused by null-pointer dereferences are often severe.
Tuning Implications. Reducing false alarms resulting from intra-or interprocedural over approximations can best be addressed by finer abstractions and specialized analysis algorithms. In the example above creating a fine grained CFG for the analysis of short circuit operators can help. Moreover, a specialized inter-procedural pointer analysis taking aliasing into account can also aid in reducing context-sensitive over-approximations. Often, incorrect warnings are caused by one of the many exceptions, and corner cases that exist is C and C++. In this case it is usually sufficient to refine the syntactic description of the properties on a intra-procedural level. This technique is also effective to cover unconventional coding practices, that are nevertheless common.
Goanna has some experimental features for creating fine grain CFGs on demand and tracking pointer aliases through several functions in a modular way. It his, however, not fully implemented yet and the results in the subsequent section are obtained without them.
Empirical Results
Our implementation is written in OCaml and we use NuSMV 2.3.1 as the backend model checker. The current implementation is a prototype working mostly on intra-procedural analysis. At the current stage, we have 18 different checks implemented. These checks cover the correct usage of malloc/free operations, use and initialization of variables, potential null-pointer dereferences, memory leaks and dead code. The CTL property is typically one to two lines in the program and the description query for each atomic proposition is around five lines when covering a lot of exceptions.
We evaluate our the tool regarding run-time performance, memory usage, and scalability, by running it on a regular basis over nightly builds of the Mozilla code base for Firefox. The code base has 1.43 million lines of of pure C/C++ code, which becomes 2.45 million lines after preprocessing. The analysis time for Firefox is 234 minutes on a DELL PowerEdge SC1425 server, with an Intel Xeon processor running at 3.4 GHz, 2 MiB L2 cache and 1.5 GiB DDR-2 400 MHz ECC memory. Some more run-time and scalability details can be found in [4] .
About 22% of the time is spent on generating the properties including NuSMV model building, 55% on model checking itself, and about 16% on parsing and 9% on supporting static analysis techniques such as interval constraint solving techniques.
These results of these runs are also used to evaluate the quality of the warnings, and to document the evolution of the checks over time. To do this we take a random sample of the warnings for each check, and analyze its strength and weakness. By addressing the weaknesses, we reduced the number of warnings from over 48000 to about 8000. But since this is still very much ongoing work these figures are subject to significant change. These reduction were not uniform over the 18 different checks, and the different checks also have a different potential for further reductions. The remainder of this section discusses the experiential outcome for a selected group of checks.
Unused Parameter and Variables. In the initial experiments unused parameters and variables accounted for more than 31000 warnings. An inspection of the warnings revealed that most of them were caused by a structural use of unused parameters and variables throughout Firefox. This was obviously an accepted coding practice, to achieve consistency throughout the code base, rather than that the warnings pinpointed to an accidental omission or error. It is interesting to note that all of these warnings were semantically correct, pointing to behavior that occurs always, and thus true positives from the view of language semantics. However, from a user perspective these warnings are of a very low severity. We divided the previous check into two check; one that flags all occurrences of unused variables, and a second that only flags those that are likely to be unused inadvertently. The first check is by default disabled, and the second reduced the number of warnings for the second check to 113, which is a 99.65% reduction. This was achieved by a slight modification of the associated syntactic requirements. This change removed about 64% of the 48000 warnings, true positive that happened always, and were semantically correct, but of little interest.
Null Pointer Dereference. One of the most common causes of bugs in C and C++ is the incorrect handling of pointers. In the first experiments gave more than 9000 warning for deference of a potential null pointer. Many of these were caused by a conservative over-approximation of the possible paths, and by improving the syntactical requirement the number of warnings was reduced to 1200. This number is still too high, and further improvements will have to come from a improved path-sensitive analysis, but more importantly an improved contextsensitive analysis. As a first test we divided the check in four parts, distinguishing between definite paths and potential paths on one side, and between potential and likely null pointers on the other hand. First experiments show a further reduction in warnings of about 75%, but a final evaluation is needed for the quality of the warnings.
Dead Code Analysis. Dead code warnings are typically of a very low severity, and our analysis tries to be very careful about flagging dead code. From the early experiments on the warning for dead code were almost always correct. However, we noticed that in a fair number of cases the dead code was inserted on purpose. A typical example are switch statements that have a return in each of the cases, which is followed by an additional return statement. Programmers often add a comment stating that the code is dead, or that dead code was inserted to make compiler warnings go away. Some compilers complain about a missing return statement in this case, even if there is one in each case of the switch statement. This case type of dead code warning account for about 25% of the warnings, and can be effectively suppressed by changing the syntactic requirement.
Virtual Function Call in Destructor.
While a virtual function call in a destructor does not have to cause a problem, it might cause memory leaks, and is considered bad coding practice, regardless of the effects. Analysis of the Firefox code base found 114 instances of such usage. From the warnings, 105 refereed to the same macro that was used 105 times, and thus caused as many warnings after preprocessing. This points to another way to improve the usability of static analysis tools, namely to present to the user with a concise set of warnings. Except for this duplication of warnings, the check itself was kept unchanged, as all of the warnings are considered valuable.
Summary. Overall, we achieved an 83% reduction in false and very low severity warning by mostly changing the precision of your rules. This was achieved by taking care of particular programming styles and strengthening our CTL properties. Encoding checks as CTL properties and switching from a may to a must analysis easily by changing the path properties proved crucial to quickly adjusting the granularity where needed.
Currently, our reported defect density is around 3.2 warnings per 1000 LoC. The best state-of-the art checkers provide a defect density around 0.35. While there appears to be a significant gap between those two numbers, when neglecting low impact properties such as unused values and taking into account must properties only, we achieve a defect density of 0.36. However, those numbers can only serve a rough comparison as we do not know about the exact properties commercial tools are implementing, their reporting strategy or the exact techniques used. Nonetheless, understanding programming styles, severity of bugs and the importance of scalability are in a first analysis round more important than deep semantic analysis techniques.
